Legal Solutions in Health Reform: Executive Authority to Reform Health: Options and Limitations by Madhu Chugh
Legal Solutions  
in Health Reform 
Executive Authority 
to Reform Health:
Options and  
Limitations
by Madhu Chugh, JD, MPP
Executive Authority to  
Reform Health:  
Options and Limitations
Madhu Chugh, JD, MPP
Legal Solutions in Health Reform is a project funded by
The RobeRT Wood Johnson FoundaTion
Prepared for 
The o’neill insTiTuTe FoR naTional and Global healTh laW  
aT GeoRGeToWn laW
600 new Jersey avenue, nW
Washington, dC 20001
for National and Global Health Law
Georgetown University
Legal Solutions in Health Reform
 
 
THE LINDA D. AND TIMOTHY J. O’NEILL 
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 
AT 
GEORGETOWN LAW 
 
The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the 
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy. Housed at Georgetown University Law 
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative 
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic 
diseases to health care financing and health systems. The Institute, a joint project of the Law 
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable 
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has 
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, 
national, and local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper 
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill 
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-
makers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for 
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
 Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon 
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, 
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many 
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare 
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care 
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, 
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
 Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, 
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond 
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a 
scientific endeavor.   
 
 Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between 
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent 
and knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order 
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President 
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health 
reform.  In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, 
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these 
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that 
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that 
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform.   In an effort to 
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the 
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may 
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research 
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health 
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key 
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other 
key players.  This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation 
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health 
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policy-
based and those that are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the 
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or 
prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of 
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for 
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services.  In contrast, legal issues are 
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution 
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as 
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning 
with, “Can we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular 
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and 
regulations, can we now…?”; 3)  “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This 
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat 
of political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems 
addressed are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a 
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.   
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is 
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or 
make recommendations among them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide 
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal 
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for 
resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, 
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal 
health reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of 
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified 
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a 
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and 
framing of the legal issues.  The attendees of the consultation session included congressional 
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide 
range of interests affected by health reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further 
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current 
law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant 
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are 
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is 
adopted, the system changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for 
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
Within constitutional and statutory boundaries, the Obama Administration can use its executive 
authority and administrative tools to reform health care incrementally without Congressional 
approval.  Under current law, the Administration can:  
 
1) promote its policy goals through demonstration projects;  
2) increase the use of health information technology;  
3) reduce drug costs;  
4) increase coverage portability; and  
5) expand SCHIP eligibility.   
 
The Administration does not, however, have the unilateral power to establish a national health 
insurance exchange, create a new small business health tax credit, or require employers to “pay-
or-play.”  
 
TOOLS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION TO REFORM HEALTH CARE: 
The Obama Administration has three primary tools to direct the actions of administrative 
agencies: regulations, sub-regulatory guidance, and executive orders.  Administrative agencies 
promulgate regulations pursuant to Congressional delegations of authority in statutes.  Sub-
regulatory guidance implements policy within an executive agency and includes letters, 
memoranda, determinations, agreements, findings, and other types of directives.  Presidents 
employ executive orders to direct the actions of agency employees and instruct them to create or 
implement particular policies. 
 
PROMOTE POLICY GOALS THROUGH DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS: 
The Administration can pursue its policy goals through Medicaid, Medicare, and SCHIP 
demonstration projects. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act (Act) gives the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) broad authority to waive certain Medicaid and SCHIP 
requirements for states to test new ideas.  Similarly, Section 222 of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1972  gives the Secretary authority to develop demonstration projects to test 
provider quality initiatives.  For example, the Secretary could allow states to expand coverage for 
low-income adults using Section 1115 waivers, or implement “pay-for-performance” for care 
received under Medicare using Section 222 waivers.  
 
INCREASE THE USE OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 
The new Administration can increase the use of health information technology (IT) through 
several ways.  President Obama can issue an executive order similar to Executive Order 13410, 
which directed administrative agencies to complete a comprehensive review of the numerous 
health IT programs currently underway and to coordinate the activities of various agencies.  
Additionally, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) can promulgate regulations 
to expand the scope of the physician reimbursement program.  Finally, CMS can create more 
demonstration projects similar to the Electronic Health Records Demonstration, which 
reimburses physicians who adopt health IT and report performance data. 
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REDUCE DRUG COSTS IN MEDICARE: 
The Administration can reduce drug costs by creating a Medicare drug re-importation program 
under section 1121 of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).  In addition, the 
Secretary can lower costs by negotiating payments with Medicare Administrator Contractors 
under its section 911 contracting authority.  Because the MMA explicitly denies the 
Administration the authority to negotiate Medicare Part D drug prices with manufacturers for 
drugs, legislative amendments would be necessary to give the Secretary negotiating power. 
 
ENHANCE PATIENT PROTECTIONS AND IMPROVE COVERAGE PORTABILITY: 
There are two ways that the Administration can enhance patient protections and improve 
coverage portability with fewer restrictions.  First, the Administration can institute greater patient 
protections in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP) to help policymakers better 
understand these protections before enacting them for the insurance industry.  Second, the 
Administration can amend the Final Rule for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) to improve coverage portability for individuals.  
 
LIFT AGENCY DIRECTIVES THAT RESTRICT SCHIP AND MEDICAID: 
The Administration can expand SCHIP and Medicaid eligibility by reconsidering current 
regulations that restrict eligibility and cut funding.  For example, President Obama issued a 
Memorandum on February 4, 2009, requesting that the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services immediately withdraw an August 17, 2007, letter -- which limits state 
health officials’ discretion to set income eligibility caps for families whose children participate in 
the children’s health insurance program -- and implement SCHIP without the requirements it 
imposed. 
 
BUILD ON FEHBP: 
Numerous policymakers have proposed opening the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan 
(FEHBP) to the public or creating a similar program for Americans with pre-existing conditions.  
The new Administration could memorialize many of FEHBP’s best practices through executive 
orders or memoranda so that private insurers and the federal government can better understand 
what policies work to reduce costs and ensure quality care.  Making coverage available to 
members of the public through the program, however, would require Congressional action. 
 
POLICIES THAT REQUIRE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT: 
Although the Administration has significant opportunities to invoke its executive authority, it can 
only act within the bounds of a statute.  There are numerous policy changes that would require 
legislative enactment first.  Any changes to the tax code or proposals to purchase insurance 
across state lines, for example, would require legislative action.  
 
CONCLUSION: 
Although the President’s executive authority could allow him to begin implementing crucial 
reforms, he also must pay careful attention to legal, budgetary, and legislative constraints on that 
authority.  The above policy recommendations are examples of ways that the new Administration 
can take incremental steps toward health care reform.  There are many opportunities for using the 
President’s executive authority and administrative tools to lay the foundation for more expansive 
health reform.  
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
Executive Authority to Reform Health: Options and Limitations 
Madhu Chugh 
 
Introduction 
 
Presidential power has provoked increasingly vigorous debate since the turn of this century.  In 
recent years, scholars and lawyers have been grappling with how Congress’s dictates may limit 
the President’s Commander-in-Chief power to detain enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, to 
fight wars abroad, and to conduct intelligence activities at home.  But policymakers have not yet 
explored the many possibilities for invoking the President’s “Take Care” power to change health 
care policy.  
 
This paper explores the scope and limits of President Barack Obama’s ability to invoke his 
executive authority to reform health care.  Specifically, it identifies ways the Obama 
Administration can use directives to: (1) expand Medicaid and SCHIP coverage through section 
1115 waivers; (2) test quality initiatives through Medicare demonstration authority; (3) expand 
health information technology; (4) allow drug reimportation and experiment with contracting 
power under Medicare; (5) enhance patient protections and private coverage requirements; (6) 
lift coverage restrictions on Medicaid and SCHIP; and (7) build on the health insurance program 
for federal employees.  Consistent with the mission of the Legal Solutions in Health Reform 
project, this paper does not endorse a particular policy.  Instead of recommending “what,” it 
explains “how.” 
 
Policymakers in the Obama Administration are not the only ones who need to understand the 
scope of executive authority.  As Congress begins to tackle its health care agenda, policymakers 
on the Hill should know how proposed legislation would affect the President’s power.  More 
specific statutes would limit the executive branch’s ability to make policy decisions.  On the 
other hand, health reform legislation that provides only the skeleton of a new program would 
provide greater opportunities for President Obama and his agencies to fill out the details.  There 
is ample precedent for this approach.  For example, Congress opened the door for President 
Roosevelt’s groundbreaking New Deal policies by authorizing the creation of new programs 
while providing minimal guidance on key details of administrative implementation.1  In addition, 
legislators should keep in mind that how they draft legislation can affect the level of deference 
that courts provide to agency interpretations of statutes.  Fewer statutory details mean greater 
judicial deference to the executive in the event of a challenge.  
 
Part I provides a user’s manual on executive authority.  With an eye toward the non-legal 
audience, it describes the various administrative tools at the President’s disposal.  Part II moves 
the discussion from the conceptual to the specific.  It suggests ways that President Obama could 
use administrative tools to reform health care.  While this paper focuses on the “how,” it borrows 
the “what” from many existing health care proposals, including policies offered during the 2008 
Presidential campaign by Barack Obama and John McCain.  Part II ends by identifying a few 
areas in which the President could not use administrative tools to make policy changes. 
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Part III assesses the potential legal, budgetary, and legislative constraints on a President’s Article 
II powers to interpret the law.  It explains how Congress and the courts can limit the President’s 
latitude to make policy changes through the administrative process.  More broadly, it highlights 
the continuing struggle between the three branches to influence health policy.  The paper 
concludes with a discussion of why congressional lawmakers should consider how their 
proposed legislation would impact executive authority as they craft health reform proposals. 
 
I.  Overview of Executive Authority 
 
Decreasing health care costs, expanding coverage, modernizing the delivery of care—there are 
an endless number of policy proposals for reforming our health care system.  Policymakers in 
Congress and in the Obama Administration are crafting the key reform proposals that will shape 
their agenda.  It is important to remember that the process through which these policies are 
created can be just as critical to the overall success as getting the substance of the policy right.  
Presidents have a wide array of administrative options at their disposal.  This section briefly 
describes these various tools and explains how executive authority has evolved during the past 
thirty years.  
 
Administrative law scholars deem the various tools at a President’s disposal as “presidential 
directives.”  There are numerous types of directives, but all share the general purpose of 
“establishing new policy, decreeing the commencement or cessation of some action, or ordaining 
that notice be given to some declaration.”2  Directives can be divided into three categories: 
executive orders and proclamations, regulatory actions, and sub-regulatory guidance.  In 
addition, Presidents use signing statements to communicate their disagreement with statutory 
provisions they believe encroach on their executive authority.  As explained in Part III, courts 
scrutinize each type of administrative tool to varying degrees when reviewing the legality of 
administrative action. 
 
A.  Executive Orders and Proclamations 
 
Perhaps the most well-known directive is the executive order, which dates back to George 
Washington’s Administration.  Presidents employ executive orders to direct the actions of 
agency employees and instruct subordinates to create or implement particular policies.3  The 
sources of authority for executive orders are twofold: one is constitutional, including the Article 
II requirement that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”4 and the other 
is any statutory language that delegates specific power to the executive branch to implement and 
flesh out the details of a duly enacted program.  Executive orders can make significant policy 
changes, particularly during wartime or when a President relies on his constitutional powers to 
deal with an emergency situation.5  For example, President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation consisted of two executive orders freeing slaves in most of the confederate states.6 
 
Proclamations, another type of presidential directive, differ from executive orders in that they are 
generally aimed at the public rather than agencies.  Modern-day proclamations generally 
encourage activity or recognize interests rather than direct specific action.7  Otherwise, most of 
the differences between proclamations and executive orders are formal rather than substantive.8  
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Like executive orders, Presidents must publish all proclamations pursuant to the requirements of 
the Federal Register Act of 1935.9 
 
B.  Regulatory Actions 
 
Regulations—also known as rules—are a common administrative tool invoked by agencies.  The 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) defines them as “the whole or part of an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, 
or prescribe law or policy.”10  Often, Congress will delegate authority to agencies to flesh out the 
details of a new program by promulgating regulations.  These rules not only must stay within the 
bounds of the statutory language, they also must be consistent with the Constitution (like any 
other directive).  In addition, the APA requires agencies to notify the public before issuing a rule 
so that interested parties can comment on the proposal.11  There is a large body of literature 
analyzing the various permutations of the regulatory process, as well as the legal weight afforded 
to regulations.  This Paper touches on these issues in Part III. 
 
C.  Sub-regulatory Guidance 
 
Sub-regulatory guidance includes letters, memoranda, determinations, agreements, findings, and 
other types of directives.12  Agencies often use sub-regulatory guidance to implement 
demonstration projects authorized by Congress, as explained in Part II.  There is an open debate 
about whether this includes forms of communication typically associated with public relations—
for example, press releases and web pages.  Presidents and their agencies have employed sub-
regulatory guidance to direct and govern the activities of federal employees, and, much like 
executive orders and proclamations, they may have the force of law if published in the Federal 
Register and issued pursuant to a valid source of executive authority.13  The only difference 
between sub-regulatory guidance and executive orders and proclamations is that there are no 
mandatory publication requirements for sub-regulatory guidance unless 1) Congress has required 
it or 2) the directives have “general applicability and legal effect.”14 
 
D.  Signing Statements 
 
Although not a presidential directive (partly because it does not establish policy), a signing 
statement is another tool in the executive’s arsenal.  When presidents sign bills into law, they 
sometimes issue official pronouncements “to forward the President’s interpretation of the 
statutory language; to assert constitutional objections to the provisions contained therein; and . . . 
to announce that the provisions of the law will be administered in a manner that comports with 
the Administration’s conception of the President’s constitutional prerogatives.”15  Often, 
Presidents use signing statements to communicate disagreement about statutory provisions that 
they believe encroach on their executive authority.  Even though Presidents technically began 
using signing statements more than two hundred years ago, President Ronald Reagan was the 
first to invoke them in voicing substantial constitutional concerns regarding statutory language.16  
It is unclear whether signing statements have the force of law.  Many scholars argue that if a 
President’s application of the statute conflicts with the wishes of Congress, signing statements do 
not provide an authoritative source of power to rectify or even assuage an unlawful 
interpretation.17  No court of law, however, has answered this question.  
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II. Legal Prescriptions for Policy Proposals 
 
The economic crisis and growing federal deficit may limit the prospect of congressional action 
on big-ticket items.  Or, conversely, the dire economic situation might create an environment in 
which “deficits don’t matter,” thereby enabling the President and Congress to propose significant 
health reform legislation.  No matter which congressional strategy the Obama Administration 
embraces, there are numerous ways the President can rely on his executive authority to create 
policies that help reshape federal programs and make improvements to the health care system.  In 
addition, President Obama can invoke various administrative tools to lay the groundwork for 
future reform, much like Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson did in the area of 
civil rights.18  
 
This section suggests ways that President Obama could use executive power to make health care 
policy without relying on Congress.  The proposals below reflect some areas of common ground 
between the health care proposals offered by President Barack Obama and Senator John McCain 
during the presidential campaign, as well as the numerous legislative proposals currently being 
considered.  This paper neither endorses nor condemns any of the policies; rather, it simply 
explains how the directives explained above may help the next President achieve some of his 
goals.  The section ends by identifying policy proposals that would require enactment of 
legislation. 
 
A.  Expand Medicaid & SCHIP Coverage Through Section 1115 Waiver Authority 
 
Nearly all of the current health reform proposals include some expansion of Medicaid and 
SCHIP.  President Obama has discussed changing eligibility requirements, while Senator 
McCain suggested experimenting with Medicaid’s payment scheme to allow greater coordinated 
care and alternative forms of access.  Senators Ron Wyden and Robert Bennett have proposed 
converting Medicaid and SCHIP into supplemental insurance programs that would “wrap 
around” private coverage.19  Senators Edward Kennedy and Max Baucus both have voiced 
strong support for instituting a variety of mechanisms to increase the number of children and 
adults covered. 
 
One of the most significant sources of executive authority for testing these ideas on a large scale 
is section 1115 of the Social Security Act.20  Congress enacted this provision to allow states to 
obtain waivers from the federal government to create demonstration projects that were limited in 
scope and short-term in nature.  But the evolution of section 1115 illustrates how President 
Obama could use the waiver authority to allow significant flexibility in state Medicaid programs, 
including coverage expansions.  
 
Section 1115 provides broad and general authority to the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) to waive statutory and regulatory provisions without congressional 
approval or public notice.  The executive branch has never issued regulations defining the 
standards or procedures that states must follow to win approval of proposed changes to the state 
programs.21  Instead, HHS has used a variety of informal, non-binding methods to communicate 
procedures and rules for the program.  HHS has, for example, published notices in the Federal 
Register; issued operations manuals; and disseminated department letters approving state 
programs, as well as letters to various state officials, researchers, and policymakers.22  
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For example, in September 1994, HHS published a public notice in the Federal Register 
announcing that the Clinton Administration would interpret section 1115 waiver authority 
broadly.23  One of the most significant aspects of the public notice was its endorsement of 
demonstration programs that lasted longer than five years.  This meant that the duration of an 
experimental project was no longer an important factor in determining whether it would win 
federal approval.24  In addition, the costs of a demonstration project would be evaluated across 
the project’s lifespan rather than on an annual basis.25  Finally, the Administration allowed states 
to redirect monies from other parts of their Medicaid programs to demonstration projects. 
 
After the Clinton Administration opened the door to massive changes in Medicaid through the 
section 1115 waiver program, the Bush Administration embarked on an era of significantly 
greater state flexibility.  In August 2001, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson announced the 
creation of the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (“HIFA”) initiative.26  These 
waivers provide an expedited review process for states requesting waiver authority to loosen 
Medicaid requirements.  In addition, HIFA’s provisions help make waivers more widely 
available.27   
 
What started out as a fairly non-existent research and demonstration program in the 1960s has 
burgeoned into a shadow federal entitlement program.  The Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) reports that as of January 2007, there have been 110 operational Medicaid and SCHIP 
waivers granted under section 1115.28  In FY2005, federal spending on these waivers totaled 
$26.6 billion, accounting for nearly 15% of all federal Medicaid spending.29  Even more 
surprising, nearly 14 million Americans receive Medicaid coverage through a section 1115 
waiver program.  
 
States are taking enormous advantage of the waiver process.  The Obama Administration must 
decide whether it wishes to continue this approach.  Some waiver programs have existed for 
more than fifteen years: states appear to re-apply and receive approval for the same program 
when nearing the expiration date.  Numerous states have also created section 1115 waiver 
programs that apply statewide: many states provide comprehensive benefits through these 
programs instead of using them solely to test financing schemes or benefit packages.  Several 
states have also used waivers to create “me, too” programs that are carbon copies of programs in 
other states.  For example, a number of states have embraced the waiver program for providing 
family planning coverage.   
 
In addition, the Obama Administration could allow states to continue using waivers to forgo 
some of the traditional requirements in Medicaid.  States must ordinarily provide coverage to all 
those in a particular group who are eligible.30  Medicaid unequivocally forbids enrollment caps, 
even when state budgets may not be able to cover everyone who is eligible.  Despite this 
requirement, previous administrations have approved state waiver programs that cap the number 
of beneficiaries covered.  Some states have also used waivers to create significant variation in the 
program design or benefits packages across the state, even though under the traditional Medicaid 
program these packages must be uniform for all participants.  Many states are also providing 
different benefits packages to different groups of beneficiaries under the waiver programs, 
disregarding Medicaid’s mandate that all persons eligible for health care coverage must receive a 
uniform benefits package.31 
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The evolution of section 1115 reveals the significant executive authority available to President 
Obama to make changes to Medicaid and SCHIP.  There are numerous opportunities for the new 
Administration and Congress to experiment with many of the policy ideas that have been 
proposed recently, including expanding eligibility, changing benefits packages, trying new 
payment schemes, and encouraging coordinated care among physicians serving Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  
 
B.  Test Quality Initiatives Through Medicare Demonstration Authority  
 
President Obama, John McCain, and a number of legislators have recommended changes to the 
Medicare program.  Senator McCain, for example, suggested that Medicare modify its payment 
scheme to base provider compensation on diagnosis, prevention, and care coordination.  He also 
proposed eliminating reimbursements for preventable medical errors and requiring disclosure of 
medical outcomes, quality of care, and costs.  President Obama has discussed plans to base 
physician payment on performance, as well as to require the use of disease management 
programs to help those suffering from chronic conditions. 
 
Medicare provides a significant source of executive authority for the President to determine 
whether these policies are worth pursuing on a larger scale.  Little known and not often used, 
demonstration authority under the Medicare program would allow the Obama Administration to 
test new policies on a temporary basis.  Section 222(a) of the Social Security Amendments of 
1972 is the source of the executive’s waiver authority.32  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) may invoke this authority to “develop and engage in experiments and 
demonstration projects” to accomplish a variety of goals, including experimenting with new 
payment or reimbursement methods to increase program efficiency; testing policies that reduce 
Medicare spending; and trying new contracting methods with providers.33  In so doing, the 
agency has extensive authority to forgo existing payment requirements for participants in the 
demonstration projects, thereby raising the possibility of increased Medicare spending.34  In 
addition, the Secretary may waive compliance with other Medicare requirements as long as they 
relate to payment or reimbursement.35  
 
Despite this significant grant of demonstration authority, previous administrations have not 
invoked it often.  Part of the reason may be that Congress usually authorizes the creation of 
Medicare demonstration projects, as it did with the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, 
thereby limiting the need to rely solely on section 222 waivers.36  Also, CMS has tended to 
invoke its section 222 authority most often to create capitated payment schemes in 
“Medicare/Medicaid integration projects for dual eligibles:” elderly and impoverished 
beneficiaries who receive benefits from both entitlement programs.37 
 
There are currently about fifty existing demonstration projects that have been authorized by 
section 222 waivers.38  A review of these projects reveals that CMS is testing payment schemes 
to accomplish a variety of goals, including paying doctors for their success (i.e., performance) in 
satisfying clinical measures;39 providing hospice services for beneficiaries living in rural areas;40 
expanding disease management and coordinated care;41 and creating new programs that improve 
the quality of care delivered, as mandated by section 646 of the 2003 Medicare drug bill.42  
Therefore, the Obama Administration could expand the use of its section 222 authority to test 
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many, if not all, of the Medicare policies that the President proposed during the campaign.  In 
addition, Congress could pass legislation to encourage experimentation of quality and other 
programs pursuant to the President’s section 222 power. 
 
C.  Expand Health Information Technology 
 
Expanding the use of health information technology is a popular bipartisan policy that finds its 
way into most legislative reform proposals.  The potential benefits are three-fold: using health IT 
could make the health care system more efficient, improve the quality of care delivered, and 
reduce costs in the long-run.43  Policymakers must resolve numerous issues in designing and 
implementing health IT programs, including financing new computer systems, protecting patient 
privacy, and creating common computer “languages” and standardizing codes so numerous 
actors – doctors, hospitals, insurers, etc. – can exchange information effectively and efficiently.44  
 
This paper sets aside those difficult policy questions and addresses how the Obama 
Administration could use existing sources of authority to expand upon the existing policies.  
With numerous health IT programs already underway in the executive branch comes the 
likelihood for confusion and duplication of efforts.  For example, at least eight agencies or 
organizations within HHS are currently involved in health IT efforts – including the American 
Health Information Community, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology, the Federal Health Architecture, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(which provides approximately $170 million in technology grants and contracts), the Health 
Resources and Services Administration, Indian Health Services, the National Institutes of Health, 
and the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services.  This does not include separate electronic 
health record systems operated by the Department of Defense and the Veterans Health 
Administration, or the many private sector initiatives being led by insurers and other non-profit 
groups.  
 
Even though the National Coordinator is partly responsible for coordinating executive branch 
efforts, his primary responsibility is to develop a national infrastructure so a majority of 
Americans have an electronic medical record by 2014.45  Obtaining a comprehensive assessment 
of all the various efforts, therefore, is necessary to know where authority lies and how Congress 
can most effectively expand the President’s power to significantly ramp up health IT efforts.  
The new administration could issue executive orders not only to direct agencies to complete a 
comprehensive review by a certain date, but also to help coordinate the activities of various 
agencies.46  
 
Additionally, as part of the Medicare physician payment legislation passed in July 2008, doctors 
may receive reimbursement increases for participating in an electronic prescribing program in 
Medicare Part D.47  Even though the legislation sets the percentage increase in reimbursements, 
CMS has significant authority to fill out the details of the program within the confines of the 
statute.  For example, CMS may determine the numerous rules that physicians must follow for 
how and what kind of data (i.e., drug type, benefits, potential chemical interactions, availability 
of alternatives) they should report -- rules that will significantly impact the number of 
participants and overall success of the program.48   
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 Although the Bush Administration has made progress in setting some of these standards 
pursuant to authority provided in the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA),49 which created 
Medicare Part D, much more work is needed for implementing the new reimbursement 
program.50  The Administrator also may provide hardship exceptions for providers who have 
difficulty satisfying the rules, including those in rural areas “without sufficient Internet 
access.”51 The new program, which was scheduled to begin on January 1, 2009, offers great 
opportunities for the new administration to experiment with e-prescribing policies until the five-
year sunset in 2013.52  Therefore, the physician reimbursement program is a source of significant 
authority to quickly expand the use of e-prescribing. 
 
Finally, the new administration could rely on CMS’s extensive demonstration authority in the 
Medicare program, as previously discussed, to experiment with reimbursement schemes that 
base payment on the quality of care provided (i.e., performance) and the use of technology.  A 
recent demonstration project created by the Bush Administration provides a useful example.  The 
Electronic Health Records Demonstration attempts to expand the use of electronic health records 
to help reduce both medical errors and costs.53  CMS does not provide any up-front grants or 
payments to help physicians install the necessary programs.54  Instead, the program pays primary 
care physicians who adopt electronic health records and then use them to provide data (which 
indicates performance) on a number of clinical quality measures, including for chronic 
conditions such as diabetes and heart disease.55   
 
There are three types of payments: an annual incentive payment lasting the duration of the five-
year program; a payment after the second year for reporting the data; and a payment after each of 
the remaining years for performance.56  The program uses existing measures endorsed by the 
National Quality Forum and used by health plans for years.57  Such a program reflects the 
breadth of opportunities available to President Obama to test various policies before seeking 
congressional approval for health IT programs.  
 
D. Promulgate Rules to Allow Drug Re-importation, As Well As Experiment With the 
Secretary’s Contracting Power Under Medicare  
 
Two important sources of executive authority provide potential opportunities for the new 
administration to reduce federal drug spending.  In 2003, Congress passed the MMA,58 making 
the biggest statutory change to the Medicare program since its enactment in 1965.  The MMA 
explicitly denies the Secretary the power to negotiate drug prices with manufacturers under Part 
D59; therefore, the Obama administration will not be able to negotiate drug prices unless 
Congress amends section 1860D-11(i) of the MMA.  However, the bill significantly expands the 
regulatory power of the HHS Secretary to implement the new drug benefit.  Yet the Secretary 
has not taken full advantage of the congressional delegations of authority.  Section 1121, in 
particular, gives the Secretary the power to allow U.S. licensed pharmacists and prescription 
drug wholesalers to re-import U.S. manufactured medications from Canada.60  The statute 
explicitly provides rulemaking authority to the Secretary to supply the details of the program 
without returning to Congress for additional grants of authority.   
 
Before moving forward, however, HHS must satisfy some threshold safety measures, including 
certifying to Congress that the program “will pose no additional risk to the public’s health and 
safety.”61  In addition, importers must provide a host of information and promise to test re-
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imported drugs.  Finally, the Department may provide waivers to individuals wishing to re-
import drugs, although statistics reveal that millions of Americans already purchase drugs from 
other countries via the Internet.62  Because the Bush Administration did not invoke section 1121 
to create a Medicare drug re-importation program, President Obama will have an opportunity to 
tap into this significant source of congressionally delegated power to help reduce Medicare drug 
spending.   
 
Certainly, the recent news about contaminated products from China give some pause regarding 
the assurance of safety in a Medicare drug re-importation program.  However, section 1121 only 
allows re-importation from Canada and provides broad authority to the Secretary to set specific 
safety guidelines before allowing foreign-made drugs to enter U.S. borders.  This “safety 
assurance” power is crucial for any steps the President wishes to take to place formal guidelines 
on the drugs that individuals are bringing across U.S. borders.  
 
Another source of potential executive power is section 911 of the MMA.63  Dubbed “Increased 
Flexibility in Medicare Administration,” the statute grants the Department authority to enter into 
contracts with “providers of services, suppliers, and individuals” that administer the drug 
benefit.64  Private insurers and other entities will serve as and largely replace the financial 
intermediaries that process the millions of claims they receive from providers each year.  
 
 The MMA’s contracting language may provide the Obama Administration opportunities to 
invoke this authority to limit program costs.  The legislative history notes that section 911 
“would permit the Secretary to competitively contract with any eligible entity to serve as a 
Medicare Administrative Contractor (MAC).”65  These new groups, operated by CMS, wield 
power to “mak[e] the payments” under Parts A and B of Medicare and to “determin[e] the 
amount of Medicare payments required to be made to providers and suppliers.”66  The legislative 
history also conveys Congress’s blessing to allow the Secretary to develop measurements for 
evaluating the MACs’ performance.  Given the broad power delegated to CMS to negotiate 
contracts and rely on competitive bidding, opportunities exist for the agency to help keep 
Medicare spending down through free-market tools.  It is important to note, however, that this 
power is limited.  The MMA constrains the executive’s authority such that the Secretary may not 
use the authority to change drug prices or the delivery system under Part D.67  MACs must make 
payments pursuant to Title XVIII requirements.68 
 
Given the recent media attention regarding the amounts Medicare pays Durable Medical 
Equipment (DME) manufacturers, there is significant concern about how the new administration 
will continue to implement this contracting authority.  As CMS finishes choosing and negotiating 
with DME MACs and the contractors for Parts A and B, the terms that CMS sets in these 
contracts at the early stages of the program will have an enormous impact on the level of costs 
savings it can generate.69  
 
E.  Enhance Patient Protections and Private Coverage Requirements  
 
Both President Obama and Senator McCain offered campaign proposals to regulate the activities 
of the insurance industry.  These proposals can be divided into two groups generally: 1) 
protecting patients’ rights and 2) ensuring affordable, portable coverage with fewer restrictions. 
In the area of patients’ rights, President Obama could invoke his executive authority to shape the 
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Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP) by ordering federal agencies to adopt 
consumer protections in their health insurance policies.70  President Clinton issued similar orders 
that directed the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to punish insurers - possibly by 
terminating their contracts - when they did not comply with the requirements in his directives.71  
This order fulfilled two goals: it expanded patients’ rights for federal employees, and it laid the 
groundwork for future legislation on managed care by creating a precedent of rules applicable to 
a large, privately-insured group.72   
 
The Senate made its most significant push for a Patients’ Bill of Rights in 2001.  Even though 
the bill ultimately was not enacted, Senator McCain joined with Senator Edward Kennedy to 
push legislation that demanded assurances of swift review and appeals processes for denial of 
coverage; added requirements on HMOs to remove barriers to specialty and emergency care; and 
provided enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance by insurance companies.  Despite its 
failure, opportunities remain for the Obama Administration to memorialize and apply many of 
these additional protections in the FEHBP through executive orders and memoranda.  Given that 
approximately 8 million people participate in the program, creating these policies in the FEHBP 
would, at the very least, help policymakers understand what works before trying to enact these 
protections for the privately insured population at large. 
 
The second source of executive authority originates with the Kennedy-Kassebaum legislation 
passed in 1996, also known as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA).73  This legislation enacted new portability and continuity of coverage requirements 
and requires insurers to offer individuals with pre-existing conditions the same access to benefits 
as the general public.  It does not, however, set price limits or guarantee affordability.  
 
HIPAA explicitly gave the President rulemaking authority to implement various parts of the 
bill.74  The Clinton Administration invoked this power to issue an interim rule detailing the 
portability requirements and other obligations imposed on insurers.  This rule covered a host of 
important policy issues, from defining the terms of enrollment to placing limitations on pre-
existing condition exclusions to determining when employers are not liable for treating 
employees’ ailments.75  The Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services 
continued to invite comments on the regulation until the end of the Clinton Administration, 
leaving it to the Bush Administration to finalize the guidelines pertaining to insurers.76  
 
On December 30, 2004, the three departments issued the final rule.77  Comprising 81 pages in 
the Federal Register, HHS billed the changes as “regulations [that] essentially adopt the interim 
final rules issued by the three agencies in 1997, but include several significant modifications.”78  
A review of the current rule reveals that much of the contents of the interim rule remained; for 
example, it emphasizes the “narrowness of permissible pre-existing condition exclusions.”79  Yet 
the current version made significant changes to the interim rule; for example, it allows insurers 
more latitude to impose a pre-existing condition exclusion for genetic illnesses.80  In addition, 
the new rule changed the requirements for HMO affiliation periods – the time before HMO 
coverage becomes effective when a plan is not required to provide benefits.  HMOs can apply 
differing affiliation periods as long as they do not violate the nondiscrimination provisions in 
HIPAA.  The language in the rule is broad enough, however, to allow insurers to potentially 
restrict coverage arbitrarily among various beneficiaries.  
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During the campaign, President Obama said that he would prohibit insurers from denying 
coverage based on pre-existing conditions.81  The new administration may choose to reexamine 
the December 30, 2004, rule to determine whether it does enough to ensure continuous coverage 
and portability, and to limit the situations in which insurers may exclude coverage for those 
suffering from pre-existing conditions.  Given the explicit rulemaking authority provided to the 
President in HIPAA,82 President Obama also has the opportunity to create greater protections 
through additional regulations and possibly new executive directives for private plans that 
provide coverage for federal employees.  The source of authority and its bounds are clear.  The 
big question facing the Obama Administration is whether it wants to invoke this fairly broad 
power to create more rules for how the insurance industry operates. 
 
F.  Lift Agency Directives Restricting Coverage Under SCHIP and Medicaid  
 
The Bush Administration has issued a number of regulations that reduce Medicaid spending.  
These new policies, among other things, allow higher premiums and co-payments for medical 
care;83 eliminate funding for school-based outreach and enrollment programs;84 cut federal 
funding for graduate medical education programs at teaching hospitals;85 and limit the types of 
children’s rehabilitative services (e.g., therapy for some developmental disabilities) that 
Medicaid will cover.86  Even though Congress has enacted moratoria on the vast majority of 
these rules, they provide only a temporary suspension.  The cost-sharing rule alone could reduce 
state and federal spending by $2.5 billion.87  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the 
rest of the regulations could eliminate more than $21 billion from the program,88 much of which 
may be absorbed by state and local governments.89  
 
If the Obama Administration wishes to reconsider and possibly rescind these regulations, it could 
invoke its executive authority in a two-step process.  First, President Obama could issue an 
executive order temporarily suspending or postponing action on regulations until further study of 
their impact.  This would allow him time to determine whether previous rationales for the rules 
coincide with the his policy objectives – much like presidents since Ronald Reagan have done – 
and determine what modifications, if any, are necessary.90  Second, HHS could change or 
permanently rescind the rules by promulgating new ones—but such a step would take time.  
HHS would need to follow the informal rulemaking requirements to ensure that no procedural 
deficiencies could open the new rules to legal challenge.  Courts tend to be less deferential to 
agencies when reviewing regulatory changes created without a change in circumstances, as 
explained in Part III.A.3.  Therefore, if the new administration chooses this approach, it should 
be careful to supply a reasoned analysis of why it believes the new agency interpretation is 
necessary.  
 
Perhaps the most assertive recent invocation of executive power in the health care context is the 
Bush Administration’s August 17, 2007, SCHIP directive.  CMS issued the directive in the form 
of a letter to State Health Officials (SHO) limiting their discretion to set income eligibility caps 
for families whose kids participate in the Children’s Health Insurance Program.91  Before 
covering children in families earning above 250% of the federal poverty limit (FPL), states must 
1) prove that they have covered at least 95% of children below 200% of the FPL; 2) ensure that 
private coverage of these children has not decreased by more than “two percentage points over 
the five-year period”;92 3) require a twelve-month waiting period for children coming off private 
coverage; and 4) impose new cost-sharing requirements.93  
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Several states, including California, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and New York, have filed suit against 
HHS, claiming that the department has violated the Social Security Act and subsequent 
amendments that govern the Medicaid program.94  The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) have issued separate reports questioning the 
legality of the Bush Administration’s directive.95  Even though several members of Congress 
have drafted legislation to override it, the new administration has a few options at its disposal to 
revoke the August 17, 2007, directive, as well as set new policy for the SCHIP program.  In fact, 
President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum on February 4, 2009, requesting that the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services immediately withdraw the August 17 
letter and implement SCHIP without the requirements it imposed.96  This memorandum 
represents one of the first instances of President Obama’s using his executive authority to 
influence health policy. 
 
G.  Build On the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program 
 
President Obama and Senator McCain both proposed policies for ensuring access to group 
coverage for those with pre-existing conditions who find it difficult to buy policies on the 
individual market.  One option that has been mentioned as a potential springboard is the Federal 
Employees’ Health Benefits Program (FEHBP).  This popular program covers approximately 8 
million people, including members of Congress, making it the largest employer-sponsored health 
insurance program in the country.97  Beneficiaries may choose between fee-for-service plans and 
HMOs, with 70% opting for the former.98  FFS policies are experience-rated, meaning that 
premiums are calculated based on “average service expenditures, administrative costs, and 
profits.”99  Unlike many other government programs, however, the statute governing FEHBP 
gives the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) enormous discretion to run the program.100   
The statute grants OPM the power to negotiate benefits packages and premiums annually with 
plans.101  In addition, OPM has the authority to suggest ways for plans to contain costs as they 
craft their proposals and premium requirements.102 
 
OPM has kept costs down compared to the other large purchasers103 by using two mechanisms to 
compel competition among the dozens of participating insurers.  First, the basic construct of 
FEHBP forces plans to compete with one another on the benefits offered.  Even though OPM 
does not define a specific benefit package, it requires a core baseline of services that all plans 
must provide.  Every plan, therefore, can build its own benefit package to cater to the population 
it hopes to attract.  Second, the statute requires that premiums “reasonably and equitably” reflect 
the cost of the benefit packages provided through FEHBP.104  The statute grants OPM the 
authority not only to adjust premiums, but also to place any remaining balances in the reserve 
funds when they prove too high.105 
 
One option for President Obama is to invoke executive orders and memoranda to memorialize 
many of OPM’s practices.  Because it operates more like a private employer than a public 
program, many of the cost-saving programs and other policies are not formally noted and 
available for public distribution.  Especially given that OPM negotiates annually with plans, the 
shelf life for these ideas may be relatively short.  President Obama could use executive tools to 
formalize many of these “best practices” for private insurers participating in other federal 
programs (i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, etc.).  To ensure the broadest reach for these policies and to 
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promote consistency across departments, the new administration should use directives such as 
executive orders or memoranda, rather than departmental letters. 
 
Another question is how much the Obama Administration could experiment with expanding the 
FEHBP.  During the campaign, the President proposed the creation of a new public plan, the 
National Health Insurance Exchange, through which small businesses and individuals could 
purchase insurance benefits similar to those offered in the FEHBP.106  The statute provides no 
discretion to the OPM to replicate or open the program to populations beyond federal employees, 
their beneficiaries, and retirees.  In order to allow others to participate in the program or a similar 
one, either by paying 100% of their own coverage or some other cost-sharing scheme, Congress 
would have to pass legislation.  If the Obama Administration wishes to test a program that allows 
non-federal employees to participate, it would have to seek statutory authority even for a 
demonstration project that would apply to a limited group of people on a temporary basis.  In 
1999, for example, Congress passed legislation creating a 3-year demonstration project run 
jointly by the Department of Defense and OPM for Tricare beneficiaries.107  Once the President 
receives the authority, the contracting and negotiating power in Chapter 89 provides enormous 
opportunity to test various policies, accumulate information about what works and what does 
not, and craft more thoughtful proposals for more permanent and broad-based changes. 
 
H.  Examples of Policies That Require Legislative Enactment 
 
Even though a President has significant executive authority to make policy changes, his actions 
must adhere to the statutory language provided by Congress.  Some of the health reform ideas 
proposed by President Obama and Senator McCain would require new legislation because the 
U.S. Code either does not provide the President the necessary authority, or it limits his 
discretion.  This section identifies two areas that would require congressional action: tax 
proposals and selling insurance across state lines.  It also reminds us that the President’s 
authority to reform health care is not boundless.  
 
The majority of health reform plans include some adjustment or revision of federal tax laws.  
Changing tax policies – by offering new tax credits, modifying the currently favorable treatment 
of employer-sponsored insurance, or eliminating various rules – would require legislative action.  
The Constitution places the power to lay taxes solely in the legislative branch.108  Therefore, the 
President may not initiate changes to the tax structure, though he may obviously encourage 
Congress to do so. 
 
During the campaign, Senator McCain offered a proposal to allow insurers to sell insurance 
across state lines in hopes of increasing competition and offering consumers greater choice.   
Such a move would require federal preemption legislation.  States have been the traditional 
regulators of health insurance, as Congress explicitly recognized in 1945.109  Even though most 
states have some similar basic standards, there is significant variation in many of their 
requirements, including access rules and types of benefits required.110  Since the 1974 enactment 
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the federal government has become 
increasingly involved in regulating the benefits health insurance companies offer under 
employer-sponsored health plans.  ERISA exempted private sector self-insured plans from state 
regulation.  In addition, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 
1986, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, provided 
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additional consumer protections applicable to all private insurers.  Despite this “floor” of federal 
rules, many insurance requirements still vary across states.  Because insurers must comply with 
the laws of every state in which they operate, Congress would have to pass legislation explicitly 
preempting state regulatory authority.  Specifically, federal legislation would be necessary to 
allow insurers to forgo some of the state rules so they could sell the same product across state 
lines.111 
 
III. Limitations on Executive Authority  
 
There are numerous ways to reform health care through the administrative process.  Yet the 
bedrock system of checks and balances ensures that executive authority is not boundless.  Even 
though the executive branch has grown in size, political aggressiveness, and policy impact, there 
are significant limitations on what President Obama can do without congressional approval.  
 
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, the “Vesting Clause,” is the starting point for 
understanding these constraints.  It entrusts the authority to run the executive branch in one 
individual – the President.112  Even though there is significant academic debate about how much 
power the President can exercise over the agencies (particularly the independent ones),113 recent 
administrations have shown that the President ultimately controls the policy and political agenda 
for the executive branch.114  In addition, the Constitution explicitly rests responsibility with the 
President for implementing Congress’s legislative directives.  Nevertheless, by dictating that the 
President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”115 the framers of the Constitution 
reminded the nation that the President’s power to implement statutes is conditioned by the 
requirement that he or she adhere to Congress’s intent as memorialized by the statutory 
language. 
 
From stage right enters the judiciary.  Courts play a critical role in making sure that the President 
does not overstep the interpretive power delegated by Congress and limited by the Constitution.  
The federal courts referee where Congress’s directives end and the President’s discretion begins.  
Indeed, during the last thirty years, the courts have imposed procedural and substantive 
constraints that limit the ability of agencies to disregard the will of Congress.  It is often difficult, 
however, to reconcile legislative intent with the interpretive latitude provided to the President, 
particularly because Congress often does not clearly articulate its intentions.  This tension has 
spawned thousands of pages of case law on the subject of judicial review.  
 
This section explains and discusses these legal doctrines to help policymakers understand the 
limitations of reforming health care through the administrative process.  It also analyzes the 
budgetary and political constraints on executive authority from both the legal and policy 
perspectives.  Because history is often the best guide, Part III ends by providing statistics and 
examples of times when Congress has aggressively responded to the President’s use of 
administrative tools. 
 
A.  Judicial Review of Administrative Tools  
 
Chevron, Skidmore-Mead, State Farm, and Youngstown. These case names are commonplace 
among lawyers because they provide the legal boundaries that limit the executive branch’s 
authority.  These cases also are critically important to health policymakers so they can determine 
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whether their proposals that rely not on Congress, but on administrative tools, encroach on the 
legislature’s power to make law and on the judiciary’s power to “say what the law is.”116  The 
goal of this section is to assess the state of the law for both the legal and non-legal audience in 
the health policy community. 
 
1.  Chevron: Statutory Interpretation  
 
We start with the iconic administrative law case, Chevron, which courts use to evaluate the 
propriety of an agency’s interpretation of statutes.  Trumpeted as one of the most important 
public law cases of the twentieth century, the Chevron Court held that when legislative language 
is ambiguous, courts should defer to an agency’s “reasonable” interpretations of the statutory 
text.117  The Supreme Court provided a now famous two-step inquiry.  First, courts should 
determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”118  If, in other 
words, Congress’s intent is unambiguously clear, then the agency must follow Congress’s 
directive.  If, on the other hand, Congress has not spoken directly to the precise question at issue 
(i.e., the statute is silent or ambiguous), it is for the federal courts to determine whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.  An agency’s construction of a statute will 
stand – even if a court disagrees with it – as long as it is deemed reasonable.119  The lesson for 
the Obama Administration is that it must be mindful of not veering too far from the statutory 
language when it implements provisions of the MMA and other laws.  
 
The Supreme Court emphasized two reasons for its groundbreaking holding: agency expertise 
and political accountability.  In explaining its decision, the Court signaled that presidential 
involvement in agency decision-making counseled for a strong form of deference:  
 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, 
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make 
such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself 
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the 
agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities.120 
 
2. Skidmore-Mead: Sub-Regulatory Guidance 
 
There are numerous situations, however, in which there is no indication that Congress intended 
to delegate authority to the executive branch to interpret the statute through regulations and other 
administrative tools that have the force of law.121  Nevertheless, agencies often need to create 
policies, such as through sub-regulatory guidance as described in Part I, to flesh out the details of 
a program when notice and comment rulemaking is impractical.   An example of such a situation 
is CMS’s August 17, 2007, letter restricting SCHIP coverage, as discussed above.  Agencies also 
can rely on these vehicles for implementing day-to-day decisions in Medicare, Medicaid, and 
other complex programs.  The Supreme Court has held that in such circumstances, it will accord 
a relatively weaker standard of deference to the agency that is “proportional to [the agency’s] 
power to persuade.” 122  Known as Skidmore-Mead deference, this second standard provides 
more rigorous review of agency action than Chevron does.  
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An agency must prove three things: first, that its interpretation is thorough, logical, and accords 
with expert views; second, that its interpretation follows from the agency’s earlier interpretations 
of the statute; and third, that other sources of weight support the interpretation.123  In short, under 
the Skidmore-Mead deference regime, the courts delve more deeply into the permissibility of an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute than they do under Chevron.  The Court recognized that the 
executive branch must often make decisions that Congress could not have foreseen, and that the 
agencies’ expertise warrants some deference.124  Nevertheless, questions remain about the level 
of deference certain forms of sub-regulatory guidance (e.g., publications on agency web pages) 
should receive.  Time and litigation will eventually provide the answers. 
 
3.  State Farm: Regulatory Changes 
 
The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that courts should look carefully at changes to 
existing regulations.  “An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change, either with 
or without a change in circumstances.  But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned 
analysis.”125  Decided the same year as Chevron, the Court in State Farm communicated its 
frustration with the Reagan Administration’s decision to rescind a safety rule for seatbelts 
despite the lack of change in external circumstances other than the election of a new president.  
Since then, the Supreme Court has acknowledged in a number of health care cases that courts 
should limit the deference provided to agency interpretations that conflict with previously-held 
views.126  
 
When a court reviews an agency’s decision to revoke or modify a regulation, it applies the 
standard for reviewing challenges to new rules: a court may set aside a rule if it is “arbitrary and 
capricious.”127  Put more plainly, an agency must offer a rational explanation for its policy 
change and show that it accounted for the relevant facts and factors.128  Even though the standard 
of review is the same for new and modified rules, satisfying this standard may be more difficult 
when the data on which the agency relied has not changed.  As the Court explained: 
 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible 
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.129 
 
State Farm review, therefore, is critically important for President Obama as he considers 
regulatory changes.  If the new administration chooses to overturn some of President Bush’s 
Medicaid or other regulations, it must anchor its explanation in data and facts that reveal a 
changed environment. 
 
4. Youngstown: Executive Orders 
 
Finally, a president often initiates policies through executive orders.  One example is President 
Clinton’s order requiring insurers to comply with patient protection requirements in the FEHBP.  
The Supreme Court has created a particular standard of judicial review for determining when an 
executive order has strayed beyond the President’s authority.  In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
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v. Sawyer, a seminal post-World War II case, the Supreme Court held that executive authority to 
issue an order “must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”130   
 
To help courts analyze the scope of presidential power, the Court provided a three-part 
framework.131  First, if the President has acted pursuant to express or implied statutory authority, 
then his “authority is at its maximum” and is “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the 
widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”132  Second, if Congress has neither delegated nor 
denied authority to the President, then he must rely “upon his own independent powers, but there 
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain.”133  Finally, if the President’s order contradicts Congress’s “express or 
implied will,” his authority is at its lowest ebb.134  Courts will uphold an executive order in such 
circumstances only when the President’s authority is based on a constitutional grant of exclusive 
power.135 
 
B.  Constraints Involving Appropriations 
 
Appropriations constraints also may limit a president’s authority to act unilaterally.  The key 
question is how much latitude a president has to determine health care spending priorities once 
Congress has made the requisite appropriations.  The President and agency officials are obligated 
to follow congressional directives in statutory text.  But the executive branch usually makes the 
vast majority of spending decisions pursuant to lump-sum appropriations by Congress. 
 
The Supreme Court provided clear guidance on this issue in Lincoln v. Vigil.  The Court held that 
agency spending decisions of a lump-sum appropriation are unreviewable in court.136  In laying 
out its rationale for the ruling, the Court emphasized the importance of permitting flexibility and 
deferring to agency expertise regarding the numerous policies and issues that must be balanced:  
 
The allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation is [an] administrative 
decision traditionally regarded as committed to agency discretion. After all, the 
very point of a lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt 
to changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as 
the most effective or desirable way.137  
 
The Supreme Court further noted that Congress could only use explicit statutory text to bind 
agencies to particular spending decisions.  “[I]ndicia in committee reports and other legislative 
history as to how funds should or are expected to be spent do not establish any legal 
requirements on the agency.”138  Obviously, the President and his agency heads run political 
risks by ignoring legislative history and other indications by Congress that convey how it wishes 
the money to be spent.  Refusing to follow these expressions, however, does not violate the law. 
 
President Obama will soon need to decide how he wishes his agencies to treat such legislative 
requests or suggestions.  In early 2008, former President George W. Bush issued an executive 
order directing agencies not “to commit, obligate, or expend funds for any earmark” in a non-
statutory source.139  In so doing, former President Bush took the discretionary principles of 
Lincoln v. Vigil one step further by ordering employees not to comply with earmark requests in 
legislative reports, letters from Members of Congress, or any other materials other than the 
explicit statutory text.140  It is too early to tell what impact the executive order will have.  One 
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obvious consequence may be that Congress increases use of explicit funding restrictions in 
appropriations legislation, including those involving health care programs.  The order goes 
against the longstanding tradition that agencies should at least consider congressional spending 
requests in committee reports and joint explanatory statements prepared by conference 
committees.141  If President Obama retains the order, it is unlikely that a court will find it 
unlawful, particularly given the Supreme Court’s significant deference in Lincoln to agency 
spending decisions.  
 
C.  Legislative Constraints: Congressional Review Act 
 
The final question is how Congress can limit a President’s executive authority to reform health 
care.  The starting point is Congress’s primary function – passing legislation.  As discussed 
above, a significant source of the President’s power comes from the authority that the legislative 
branch delegates through statutory text.  Because Congress has increasingly delegated extensive 
power to flesh out the details of federal programs – which can be just as significant as the 
authorization itself – presidents have been able to take unilateral action much more often, 
particularly during the last thirty years.142  Within this expanding sphere of power, presidents can 
utilize the many administrative tools available to shape policy. 
 
But delegation is mostly a positive concept; it focuses on the power granted rather than 
limitations placed on authority.  The flipside is the negative act.  Specifically, how could 
Congress undo the President’s use of executive authority?  Congress may limit agencies’ 
discretion through a number of processes, including appropriations bills.  Perhaps the most 
significant tool available is the Congressional Review Act (CRA).143  Enacted in 1996, the Act 
requires agencies to submit all rules to Congress before they can take effect.  It allows Congress 
to pass a joint resolution disapproving of regulations issued by agencies, which the President 
must sign before the resolution takes effect.144  The CRA also provides expedited procedures for 
Congress to consider and disapprove of rules.  For most rules, Congress has 60 days from when 
it receives the rule to start the joint resolution process.145  Once Congress enacts the resolution, 
“the agency may not reissue either that rule or any substantially similar one, except under 
authority of a subsequently enacted law.”146 
 
The question then is: how often has Congress successfully reversed regulations and other 
directives by the executive branch?  Congress has overturned only one rule under the CRA -- a 
Clinton Administration ergonomics regulation in 2001.  That should be unsurprising:  garnering 
a two-thirds vote in each chamber to overturn a presidential directive (assuming the president has 
vetoed Congress’s first attempt) is extraordinarily difficult.  Anecdotal evidence reveals that 
legislators from 1940 to 1970 were equally unsuccessful at stopping Presidents’ efforts to create 
policy unilaterally.147  
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Conclusion 
 
As the Obama Administration crafts key policy and reform proposals for the coming years, 
health reform is a priority.  The executive branch has the power to create, shape, and promote 
policy, including in health care.  This authority is replete with legal issues steeped in both 
constitutional and statutory law, as well as the history of governing our nation.  This paper 
describes ways that the President can work within constitutional and statutory boundaries to 
implement health reform.     
 
While this paper does not purport to recommend particular uses of that executive authority, or to 
take a position on whether executive authority should be used expansively or sparingly, it 
analyzes the contours of the President’s executive authority, and applies it to policy proposals 
identified by key players in the health reform debate.  Specifically, this paper discusses 
administrative strategies to: (1) expand Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) coverage through section 1115 waivers; (2) test quality initiatives through 
Medicare demonstration authority; (3) expand health information technology; (4) allow drug re-
importation and experiment with contracting power under Medicare; (5) enhance patient 
protections and private coverage requirements; (6) lift coverage restrictions on Medicaid and 
SCHIP; and (7) build on the health insurance program for federal employees. While President 
Obama has already taken steps toward implementing his agenda, more options are available to 
achieve the Administration’s policy goals.   
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